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MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE FEDERAL-
INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP AFTER MITCHELL II-
United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
The "trust" I relationship between the federal government and the Indi-
ans has been an evolving doctrine in Indian law. 2 Initially, fiduciary lan-
guage was used to describe a political and moral relationship between the
government and Indians. 3 Over the years, courts have cited the federal-
Indian "trust" relationship as authority in several different contexts: to
justify governmental exercise of power over Indian affairs, 4 to check the
authority of governmental officials, 5 and to place an affirmative duty on
the government to act on behalf of Indians. 6 In addition, Congress has
enacted statutes that contain both general and specific trust language. 7
1. Courts and lawyers use the term "trust" in a variety of senses. I A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF
TRusTs § 2 (3d ed. 1967). Throughout this Note, the term "trust" is used loosely to refer to the
relationship between the federal government and Indians. Caution is required when using the term
"trust" loosely because there are a number of relationships that resemble trusts. These other relation-
ships are not, however, trusts in the narrower sense of the term, and many of the principles that are
applicable to trusts are not applicable to the other relationships. Id. § 4A.
2. For a discussion of the development of the relationship, see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement
of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1213-34 (1975); Newton,
Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship after Mitchell, 31 CAm. U.L. REv. 635 (1982);
Note, North America's Indians and the Trusteeship Concept, 4 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 137 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (federal government
has "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831) (relationship described as that of a ward to a guardian; tribes are
distinct political societies, "domestic dependent nations").
4. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1926) (Pueblo Indians and
lands subject to legislation of Congress enacted in exercise of the government's guardianship over the
Indian tribes and their property); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (federal government
has power to dispose of Indian land as guardian of the tribe); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
384 (1886) (Indians' position of weakness and helplessness gives the federal government the duty and
the power to protect them).
United States v. Candelaria was the last case to cite the trust relationship as an independent source
of power. Since then the Constitution has been cited for providing Congress with power over Indian
tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress is authorized to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); see F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 207-28 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974) (agency promulgation of standards re-
quired for fair management of off-reservation gratuities).
6. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,379 (Ist
Cir. 1975) (affirmative federal duty to investigate and take action to protect Indians' right of occu-
pancy); White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (D.S.D. 1977), affid, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.
1978) (affirmative federal duty to pay hospital costs of an indigent Sioux when tribal court committed
the Sioux to a state hospital).
7. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. 88 331-358 (1982)). Section 348 provides generally that the United States will hold land "in
trust" for Indian allottees. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982). On the other hand, forest resource management
duties are explicitly defined in id. 88 405-407.
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Recently, plaintiffs have relied upon the federal-Indian trust relation-
ship more often to provide a legal basis for holding the federal govern-
ment liable in money damages for breach of its trust duties. 8 In United
States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 11)9 the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of
Claims decision holding the United States accountable in money damages
for breach of fiduciary duties in its management of forest resources on
allotted lands of the Quinault Reservation. 10 Although it had rejected a
similar claim by the same plaintiffs" based on the General Allotment
Act,12 the Court found that timber management statutes and regulations
created governmental duties that implicitly required compensation for
breach. 13
This Note will examine the elements of a money damages claim against
the government for breach of trust in light of Mitchell II. It will first ex-
plore the grounds on which Indian plaintiffs may rely to establish fiduci-
ary duties owed them by the government. It will then evaluate the Court's
analogy to the common law of trusts to find that the government is liable
in money damages for a breach of these duties.
I. BACKGROUND
The Quinault allottees 14 filed actions in the Court of Claims under the
8. See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 46 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3569 (1983); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
The relationship has also provided the basis for awarding equitable relief. See, e.g., Lane v. Pue-
blo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. I 10 (1919) (government may be enjoined from disposing of Indian lands
under public land laws); People ofTogiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979) (court
invalidated Department of Interior regulations that purported to transfer to the state of Alaska the
power to regulate walrus hunting; federal trust responsibility preempts state regulation); Pyramid
Lake Pauite Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973) (government water supply
regulation held to be arbitrary and struck down), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
However, in many cases injunctive relief is inadequate, and money damages provide the only
meaningful remedy. For example, in the case of timber mismanagement, a prospective remedy is
virtually worthless. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
9. 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
10. Id. at 2965. The Court of Claims has since been changed to the United States Claims Court
by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 133, 96 Stat. 25. 41.
II. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (Mitchell !). Mitchell I is discussed
infra Part IB. For a further discussion of Mitchell I, see Hughes, Can the Trustee be Sued for its
Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REv. 447 (1981); Newton, supra note
2.
12. The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1982)); see supra note 7.
13. MitchellI1. 103 S. Ct. at 2972-73.
14. The respondents are hereinafter referred to as the Quinault allottees. However, the respon-
dents also include individuals owning interests on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated asso-
ciation of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Quinault Tribe. Id. at 2964.
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Tucker Act' 5 seeking money damages from the United States for alleged
waste and mismanagement of timber lands on the Quinault Reservation. 16
They claimed that the government had failed to obtain a fair market price
for timber sold, failed to pay interest on certain funds, failed to manage
timber on a sustained yield basis, failed to develop a proper system of
roads and easements, and exacted improper administration fees. 17 The al-
lottees claimed that this mismanagement was a breach of the United
States' fiduciary duty owed them under various federal statutes. 18 The
allottees brought their suit for money damages in the Court of Claims
asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction. 19
A. Tucker Act Jurisdiction
Congress enacted the Tucker Act to give the Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion to hear claims against the United States for money damages. 20 Con-
gress later enacted the Indian Tucker Act,21 allowing the Court of Claims
to hear tribal claims that would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the
claimant were not an Indian tribe. 22 Courts have construed the Tucker Act
to require claimants to establish (1) a federally recognized substantive
right that (2) can be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation. 23 The
15. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
16. Mitchell!!, 103 S. Ct. at2964.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Court of Claims in Mitchell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1979),
concluded that the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty of the United States to manage the
timber resources properly. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535,
542 (1980), holding that the General Allotment Act created only a limited trust relationship that did
not impose any duty on the government to manage timber resources, and that any right to money
damages must be found in some other source of law. Id. at 546 n.7. In Mitchell v. United States, 664
F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the Court of Claims once again ruled for the allottees and held that the
timber management statutes implicitly require compensation for damages sustained as a result of the
government's breach of its duties. The Court affirmed this decision in Mitchell 1I. 103 S. Ct. at 2965.
20. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The
Tucker Act provides in pertinent part:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982). The Tucker Act also provides concurrent jurisdiction in the district
courts over claims not exceeding $10,000. Id. § 1346(a)(2).
For a discussion of the history of the Tucker Act, see Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2965-67; Hughes,
supra note 11, at 451-60; Orme, Tucker Act Jurisdiction over Breach of Trust Claims, 1979 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 855, 855-60.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1466,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945).
23. Mitchell!1, 103 S. Ct. at 2968; see also Army & Airforce Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S.
728,738-39(1982).
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first element is derived from the sources of law listed in the Tucker Act; 24
the Tucker Act does not of itself create any substantive rights. 25 There-
fore, these other sources of law must create a substantive right in a claim-
ant.2 6 The second element requires that the substantive right be "fairly
interpreted as mandating compensation." 27 Thus, only claims for money
damages under these substantive rights are cognizable under the Tucker
Act.2 8
B. The Mitchell I Opinion
In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I),29 the allottees argued that the
General Allotment Act created a fiduciary obligation requiring the gov-
ernment to compensate them for timber mismanagement. The Court de-
nied the claim. The Court first held that the Tucker Act itself does not
waive sovereign immunity. 30 Rather, waiver must be found in the source
of law relied upon for the substantive claim. 31
The Court then held that the General Allotment Act does not establish a
right to recover money damages against the United States. 32 Although the
Act provides that the United States will hold land "in trust" for Indian
allottees, 33 the Court held that the Act created only a limited trust rela-
tionship. 34 The Court found that the Act does not impose any fiduciary
management duties on the government, nor render it liable for breach. 35
Prior to Mitchell II, the Court reasoned that the Tucker Act did not waive sovereign immunity;
waiver had to be found separately in the source of law on which the claim was brought. See infra
Parts 1B, II.
24. The Tucker Act lists several sources of law for which it provides jurisdiction. See supra note
20. Most claims brought for money damages against the United States for breach of trust have been
based on either an act of Congress or a regulation of an executive department.
25. Mitchell !!, 103 S. Ct. at 2967-68; Mitchell 1. 445 U.S. at 538; United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
26. Mitchellll. 103 S. Ct. at 2968.
27. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also Mitchell
//. 103 S. Ct. at 2968; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400. The Court in Eastport S.S. Corp.
gave examples of two types of claims that would fall within Tucker Act jurisdiction. The first is
where the plaintiff has paid money over to the government and seeks its return. The second is where
the plaintiff alleges that the law entitles the plaintiff to be paid a certain sum, either expressly or by
implication. 372 F.2d at 1007-08.
28. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1969); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530. 557
(1962); Eastport S.S. Corp., 372 F.2d at 1007.
29. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
30. Id. at 538.
31. ld.; see infra Part II (discussion of this issue in Mitchell ll).
32. Mitchell!, 445 U.S. at 546.
33. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
34. Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at 542.
35. Id. at 544. The Court stated that the purpose of the Act was to prevent improvident alienation
of the allotted lands and to assure the immunity of the lands from state taxation. Id.
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Having begun the opinion with a search for a statutory waiver of sover-
eign immunity, the Court used principles of strict construction appropri-
ate to finding such a waiver.36 The Court did not then consider whether
the General Allotment Act constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity, 37
yet it continued to use strict construction in interpreting the General Allot-
ment Act. 38 Using strict construction principles, the Court found that the
language of the Act did not "unambiguously provide" that the United
States had undertaken a fiduciary duty to manage the allotted lands. 39
Therefore, after Mitchell I, commentators feared that claimants could no
longer rely on courts to liberally construe statutes as imposing trust duties
on the government.40
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims to consider other
statutes that may have created governmental management duties. 41
II. THE MITCHELL H OPINION
The Mitchell 11 Court affirmed the Court of Claims decision that the
timber management statutes impose fiduciary duties on the government
that impliedly require compensation for breach. The Court reached this
holding for several reasons. First, the Mitchell 11 Court held that the
United States has presumptively consented to suit for claims under the
Tucker Act.42 The Court thereby overruled the Mitchell I holding that a
waiver of sovereign immunity must be found separately in the source of
law on which a claim is brought under the Tucker Act. 43
The Court next held that the timber management statutes and regula-
36. Id. at 538; see also Newton, supra note 2, at 657.
37. Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at542.
38. Id. (Act does not unambiguously provide that United States has undertaken fiduciary duties);
see also Newton, supra note 2, at 644.
39. Mitchell!, 445 U.S. at 542.
40. After the strict construction approach taken by the Court in Mitchell I for claims based on
statutes, commentators looked to other sources in the Tucker Act as possible authority for breach of
trust claims.
For a discussion of the possibility of claims for breach of trust based on the Constitution, see
Newton, supra note 2, at 667-68; Note, Indian Breach of Trust Suits: Partial Justice in the Court of
the Conqueror, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 507, 529-33 (1981). For the possibility of a claim based on
breach of contract, see Newton, supra note 2, at 669-72; Note, Whom Can Indians Trust after Mitch-
ell?, 53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 179, 191 (1981). For a discussion of the possibility of claims based on
cases not sounding in tort, see Newton, supra note 2, at 672.
41. Mitchell!, 445 U.S. at 546 n.7.
42. United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961, 2967 (1983).
43. Id. Interestingly, Justice Marshall was the author of both Mitchell I and Mitchell 11.
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tions44 created substantive rights in the allottees. 45 The Court contrasted
the fiduciary duties created by the forest management statutes to the
"bare" trust created by the General Allotment Act relied on by the allot-
tees in Mitchell 1.46 It found that the more specific statutes relied on in
Mitchell II clearly make the federal government responsible for managing
Indian resources for the allottees' benefit. 47
Additionally, the Court adopted the Court of Claims' reasoning that
where the government assumes control or supervision over property be-
longing to the Indians a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises. 48 The
Court apparently offered the control rationale as an independent ground
for finding a fiduciary duty. 49 In doing so, the Court reasoned that all of
the elements of a common law trust were present. 50
After concluding that a substantive right had been created, the Court
analogized to the common law of trusts to hold that the statutes and regu-
lations mandated compensation. 51 The Court reasoned that liability in
money damages naturally follows when a trustee breaches a fiduciary
duty. 52 In addition, the Court relied on prior precedent recognizing a
damages remedy when the government breaches its trust relationship with
an Indian or Indian tribe. 53 The Court also reasoned that a damages rem-
edy furthered the purpose of the statutes, and that prospective equitable
remedies were totally inadequate. 54 The Court therefore allowed the allot-
44. Forest resources on allotted lands are managed by the Department of the Interior through the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 405-407 (1982) (timber sales must be based
upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs, id. § 406(a);
proceeds are to be used to benefit the Indians or transferred to the Indian owner, id. §§ 406(a), 407).
In addition, the Bureau must adhere to principles of sustained-yield forestry. Id. § 466. Under these
statutes, the Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing the management of Indian
timber. 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.1-.33 (1983). For a detailed discussion of these statutes and regulations,
including the legislative history, see Brief for Respondent at 18-28, Mitchell 1.
45. Mitchell!!, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
46. Id. at 2971-72.
47. Id. at 2972.
48. Id.
49. The Court stated, "Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Govern-
ment assumes such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians." Id.
50. Id. The Court, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment h, at 10 (1959).
concluded that the United States was the trustee, the Indian allottees were the beneficiaries, and the
Indian timber, lands, and funds were the trust corpus.
51. The Court noted that it is well established that a trustee is accountable in damages for
breaches of trust. MitchellH, 103 S. Ct. at 2973.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2973 n.31.
54. Id. at 2973. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statutes and regulations is to require
the Secretary to manage Indian resources so as to generate proceeds for the Indians. Without a dam-
ages remedy, this purpose would be frustrated. Further, because it would take many years for the
timber to be restored, prospective relief would be next to worthless by the time damages to the re-
sources became apparent. Id.
680
Federal-Indian Trust Relationship
tees to proceed with their claims, and remanded the case to the Court of
Claims for further proceedings.
The dissent argued that the majority departed from clear precedent in
holding that the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity. 55 In addition,
the dissent disagreed with the conclusion that the timber management
statutes imposed management duties on the government that could fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation. 56 The dissent would have
strictly construed congressional intent in interpreting the statutes. 57 Fi-
nally, the dissent argued that the majority was applying bootstrap reason-
ing to find that liability followed from breach of trust duties by analogiz-
ing to the common law of trusts. 58
III. ANALYSIS
After Mitchell H, it is unclear what will establish a substantive right in
breach of trust cases. After a right is established, however, under Mitchell
II the right will be found to mandate compensation by analogizing to the
common law of trusts. The first section of this analysis examines the sub-
stantive right requirement of the Tucker Act in light of Mitchell H. The
second section evaluates the Mitchell II Court's analogy to the common
law of trusts in holding that a substantive right can be fairly interpreted as
mandating compensation.
A. The First Requirement: Substantive Right
In breach of trust cases, the substantive right that claimants must estab-
lish is a governmental fiduciary duty. The Mitchell II Court held that the
statutes and regulations at issue clearly established fiduciary duties in the
management of Indian timber resources. 59 The Court also held that a fi-
duciary relationship arises when the government assumes control over In-
dian property. 60 Thus, there are two possible sources of fiduciary du-
ties-statutes and assumption of control. 61 In the first, a court could take
a strict construction approach to find a fiduciary duty, or it could infer a
55. Mitchell 1I, 103 S. Ct. at 2974-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2975-77.
57. Id.
58. Id.at2977-78.
59. Mitchell 1I, 103 S. Ct. at 2972-73.
60. Id. at 2972.
61. A final source of a substantive right may be an affirmative duty on the part of the government
to take action where no statutory management scheme exists. See cases cited supra note 6. The dis-
cussion of an affirmative duty is beyond the scope of this Note, which examines only money damages
as a remedy for malfeasance of duties.
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duty from the statutory scheme. Under the strict construction approach,
however, most claims would fail. More logical and equitable results
would be reached by inferring a duty from a statute or by finding a duty in
the second source-governmental assumption of control in an area of In-
dian affairs. Mitchell II contains support for these latter two approaches.
1. Statutory Basis
In determining whether particular statutes impose fiduciary duties to-
ward Indians, prior courts have examined the plain language of the statute
or regulation, 62 its legislative history, 63 and the rules of construction ap-
plicable to Indian law. 64 In evaluating these indicia of congressional in-
tent, the majority and dissent disagreed over the level of scrutiny to be
applied in Mitchell 11.65 The Mitchell I Court66 and the Mitchell H dis-
sent67 reasoned that courts should find enforceable fiduciary duties only
62. E.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 254 (1980).
63. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2969-71; Mitchell !, 445 U.S. at 543-46; Eric v. Secretary of
United States Dep't of Hous., 464 F. Supp. 44, 48-49 (D. Alaska 1978).
64. There are three general canons of construction applicable in Indian law. First, treaties should
be liberally construed in the light most favorable to Indians. See, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1956): Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832); Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d
254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Second, ambiguous ex-
pressions should be resolved in favor of Indians. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 175 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521
F. Supp. 1072, 1110-32 (D. Utah 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
Third, treaties should be construed as the Indians would have understood them. See, e.g., Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304
U.S. I11, 116(1938).
These rules of construction are not limited to treaties. The policy of the rules is rooted in the trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 223-24.
65. The Mitchell 1 Court reasoned that the language of the provisions directly supports the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship, 103 S. Ct. at 2972, as does the legislative history, id. at 2969-71,
and rules of construction, id. at 2972. The dissenting judges, however, disagreed with each of these
findings. Id. at 2975-77 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at 538, 542 (General Allotment Act does not "unambiguously provide"
that the United States has undertaken management responsibilities).
67. Mitchell I1, 103 S. Ct. at 2974 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (trust responsibility can only arise from express lan-
guage of a statute, treaty, or executive order); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1194, 1198 (Ct. CI. 1970) (same) (quoting Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 776, 781 (Ct. Cl. 1956)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819
(1970); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAw TRAINING PROGRAM) 3073.
3076 (D.D.C. June 15. 1981) (same); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 373 (W.D. Wash.
1981) (same).
Despite the strong language in Mitchell 1, some courts continued to use a liberal approach in find-
ing fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Moose v. United States, 674 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982); Duncan
v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 41-43 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3569 (1983): Mitchell
v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 270 (Ct. CI. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
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where a statute or regulation expressly creates trust responsibilities and
specifically provides that the United States will be liable in money dam-
ages for breach.
The majority in Mitchell II inferred congressional intent to create fi-
duciary duties from the existence of a comprehensive statutory manage-
ment scheme. 68 The Mitchell H Court distinguished the General Allot-
ment Act relied on in Mitchell I from the timber management statutes
before it. According to the Court, the more particular statutes clearly gave
the government detailed responsibilities in managing Indian timber. 69 In
contrast, the Court found that the General Allotment Act created no par-
ticular management duties. 70 Thus, it appears that the statutory scheme
relied upon must delineate management duties.
In addition, rather than require express fiduciary language, the Mitchell
H approach relies on both the "general trust relationship" between the
federal government and Indians71 and the liberal rules of construction ap-
plicable to Indian law72 in finding a fiduciary duty. Thus, the presence or
absence of trust language is not dispositive. 73 Indeed, the Court in Mitch-
ell II reaffirmed its Mitchell I conclusion that the General Allotment Act
creates only a limited trust relationship, 74 despite the language in the
68. Mitchell!!, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
69. Id. at 2971-72.
70. Id. at 2964-65 (quoting Mitchell!, 445 U.S. at 542). The Court in Mitchell I held that the
trust language of the General Allotment Act served only to prevent improvident alienation of the
allotted lands and to assure their immunity from state taxation. 445 U.S. at 544.
71. The Court in Mitchell ! recognized the "undisputed existence of a general trust relation-
ship" between the Indians and the United States. 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
At least one court has used this relationship as the sole basis for a breach of trust claim. Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (fact that Indians' right of occupancy of lands finds no
recognition in any statute or other formal governmental action is not conclusive; under the circum-
stances, the right flows from a settled govenmental policy). Other courts have also tended to base
holdings for breach of trust claims on the general trust relationship; however, in those cases there
were also general statutes in the background. See People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp.
423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979); Eric v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46-47
(D. Alaska 1978) (action under governmental assistance statute, but court recognized the trust rela-
tionship as a common law doctrine); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp.
252, 256 (D.D.C. 1973) (general federal trust duties are based on the vast amount of case law and the
detailed statutory scheme for Indian affairs in 25 U.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1375 (D.D.C. 1973); Manchester Band
of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
72. See supra note 64.
73. The underlying statute or regulation need not actually use the word "trust" to create fiduci-
ary duties. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2972 (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624
F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). This position had been taken by the Court of Claims. See, e.g.,
American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United States, 667 F.2d 980,
990 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Duncan v. United States, 667 F.2d 36, 41-43
(Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3569 (1983); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624
F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Cherry v. United States, 594 F.2d 795, 799-800 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
74. Mitchell!!, 103 S. Ct. at 2971-72.
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General Allotment Act that lands are held "in trust for the sole use and
benefit of the Indian.', 75
Although the Court reached the same conclusion regarding the Act in
each case, it took a different approach to finding a fiduciary duty in each.
Under the analysis of Mitchell I, a statute must "unambiguously pro-
vide" that the United States has undertaken a fiduciary duty. 76 Using this
standard, the Court held that the General Allotment Act did not create a
fiduciary duty. Under Mitchell H, however, a more liberal approach to
finding a fiduciary duty was adopted. A detailed statutory management
scheme will create fiduciary duties, 77 as will the government's assump-
tion of control in Indian affairs. 78 Because neither of these theories was
applied to the General Allotment Act, Mitchell H could be interpreted as
affirming the decision that the General Allotment Act created no fiduciary
duty.
The Mitchell H Court's approach is clearly preferable to that taken in
Mitchell I. The Mitchell I Court's strict analysis is inconsistent with the
liberal rules of statutory construction applied elsewhere in Indian law. 79
In addition, if statutes and regulations must "unambiguously provide"
that trust responsibilities have been created, many claims would fail to
meet the statutory test. Although the outcomes in the two cases can be
reconciled, the strict construction approach of Mitchell I cannot be recon-
ciled with the more liberal approach taken in Mitchell II and should be
rejected.80
The Mitchell HI Court did not, however, determine how extensive a
statute must be in delineating governmental duties before it will state an
enforceable claim for money damages. The Court's acknowledgement of
a general trust responsibility and of the liberal rules of construction appli-
cable to Indian law suggest that detailed delineation of management du-
ties might not always be required. In fact, the Court recognized elaborate
control by the government over Indian property as an independent basis
for its finding of a fiduciary duty. 81 This reasoning suggests that no spe-
75. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
76. Mitchelll, 445 U.S. at 542.
77. Mitchell Il, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
78. See infra Part IIA2.
79. See supra note 64; see also supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
80. Although the Court in Mitchell II overruled the holding of Mitchell I that the Tucker Act does
not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity, 103 S. Ct. at 2967, it did not expressly reject the strict
construction approach the Mitchell I Court took in holding that there was no fiduciary duty.
81. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 1961; see infra Part IIIA2: see also Duncan v. United States, 667
F.2d 36, 42-43 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (federal trust need not spell out all duties of the government due to the
history of the governmental fiduciary obligation in management of Indian property-broad scale con-
gressional establishment of trust is enough), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3569 (1983). The Duncan court
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cific statutory basis would be required to create a fiduciary duty in some
cases. This will provide for an equitable solution in many cases, as most
statutory schemes in Indian affairs are not as detailed as the timber man-
agement statutes. 82
2. Assumption of Control
Statutes are not the only sources of substantive rights. The Mitchell II
Court stated as an independent rationale for its decision that a substantive
right exists because "a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the
Government assumes such elaborate control over forests and property be-
longing to Indians.' '83 Mitchell II did not deal solely with this situation
because a detailed statutory scheme was also present. Subsequent courts,
however, may use this reasoning to hold that a substantive right need not
require a detailed statutory scheme. In fact, the Court of Claims had
adopted this reasoning prior to Mitchell II, in a decision that was cited
with approval in Mitchell 11.84
Two uncertainties exist in the application of assumption of control as a
source of a fiduciary duty. First, the source of the substantive right must
fit within Tucker Act jurisdiction. Second, it is unclear how much "con-
trol" is required before a right will be created.
The Tucker Act does not include federal common law as a basis for a
substantive right.85 However, there are two theories by which a plaintiff
could bring an assumption of control claim under the Tucker Act. First,
the general trust relationship could provide the statutory source of sub-
stantive law if the relationship is found in the many statutes, treaties, and
regulations dealing with Indians. 86 Second, a general statute in an area of
states in a footnote that "[i]t is difficult to see why Congress should have to do more to create an
Indian trust than a private settlor would have to do to establish a private trust." Id. at 43 n.10.
82. Most statutes that regulate Indian affairs do not delineate specific management duties or pro-
vide for money damages as a remedy for mismanagement. See Newton, supra note 2, at 681. Mineral
leasing statutes, however, also provide some detailed statutory regulation. See 25 U.S.C. §§
396(a)-(g), 398, 398(a)-(c) (1982).
83. Mitchell 1I, 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
84. Id. (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
85. See supra note 20.
86. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. (1982); see also infra text accompanying note 88.
The general trust relationship has been used as the basis for a suit for breach of trust, at least in
equity. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1973) (denial of benefits authorized but not required
under the Snyder Act, 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), to Indians living near a reservation is contrary to the
trust obligation incumbent upon the government); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923)
(right of occupancy not found in any statutory or other formal governmental authority is not conclu-
sive; right flows from governmental policy); see also cases cited supra note 8.
Further, the Court in Mitchell 1I emphasized the existence of a general trust relationship between
the government and Indians. 103 S. Ct. at 2972. Although the general trust relationship alone proba-
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Indian affairs could be held to apply in most cases. However, neither a
general statute nor the general trust relationship is likely to support a
claim for money damages for a breach of duty. Nevertheless, either could
provide the source of law on which to base the right, and the govern-
ment's assumption of control could define the contours of the right.
Assumption of control by the government is necessary in order to hold
the government liable for breach of trust where there is no detailed statu-
tory scheme. It would be difficult to show that the general trust relation-
ship or a vague statute imposes any specific fiduciary duties on the gov-
ernment. Where there is nothing from which to define a duty, a court
would not likely be willing to find the government liable in money dam-
ages for breach of trust. In addition, it would be difficult to decide which
Indian interests should be protected. For example, prior courts have been
reluctant to extend the trust doctrine to include a duty to protect a tribe's
autonomy, governmental powers, or actual identity. 87
However, once the government has assumed responsibilities in Indian
affairs, those responsibilities can define the scope of its trust duties. Once
having undertaken control in specific areas of Indian affairs, the govern-
ment should be held to the high standard of care appropriate to its fiduci-
ary relationship with Indians. Logic and fairness both suggest that the
government should be responsible to the extent of the fiduciary responsi-
bility actually assumed.
Moreover, this would produce a more equitable result. Absent specific
statutory or regulatory authority, the government assumes responsibilities
under the federal-Indian trust relationship embodied in the broad statutes
that govern Indian affairs. 88 If the government assumes management du-
ties under the general trust relationship it should be held liable for mis-
management under the same doctrine. Otherwise, the government can as-
bly will not give rise to relief in the form of money damages, the relationship is not completely
without meaning as providing a remedy. It has been used as a theory for equitable relief.
The relationship has been employed to impose procedural protections against the authority of exe-
cutives. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973) (strict administrative standards are required for
management of off-reservation gratuities); Eric v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous.. 464 F.
Supp. 44. 78 (D. Alaska 1978). The relationship has also been used to impose a strict standard of
review over administrative decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians. 448 U.S.
371 (1980); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-57 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied.
419 U.S. 1008 (1974). See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (reasonable and
rationally tied standard of evaluating legislation enacted to further Indian self-government).
87. See, e.g.. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying
claim for injunction against off-shore leasing, even though it could harm the bowhead whale, which
was part of tribe's subsistence culture); see also Chambers, supra note 2, at 1242-46; Newton. supra
note 2, at 676-77.




sume unlimited authority in Indian affairs without any corresponding
liability for misuse of that authority. Such a result conflicts with the pol-
icy underlying the general trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Indians. Courts in the future should recognize a governmen-
tal fiduciary duty whenever the government assumes control over Indian
affairs. The absence of a detailed statutory scheme should not prevent
such a recognition.
There is a danger, however, in reading too broadly the language in
Mitchell II that adopts the assumption of control reasoning. After reason-
ing that a fiduciary relationship arose when the government assumed con-
trol over Indian property, the Court also decided that the elements of a
common law trust were present. 89 Thus, the Court used common law trust
reasoning to find a substantive right as well as a damages remedy. 90 As a
result, the Mitchell II decision may be read to suggest that successful
claimants in breach of trust cases must establish only the elements of a
common law trust (a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus). 91 The fed-
eral-Indian relationship is, however, sui generis 92 and should not be gov-
erned by the common law of trusts-a separate and distinct body of
law. 93 The Court probably did not intend that the elements of a common
law trust be all that is required to determine that an enforceable trust rela-
tionship for money damages exists between the federal government and
the Indians. Viewed in context, the Court actually relied on the assump-
tion of control reasoning to conclude that a fiduciary duty had been cre-
ated and was merely restating its conclusion by saying that the elements
of a common law trust were present.
B. The Second Requirement: Fairly Interpreted as Mandating
Compensation
Establishing a federally recognized right that may fit within the scope
of the Tucker Act is only the first step in establishing a claim for money
damages. Courts have also required that the source of the substantive
right "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation" by the fed-
89. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2972-73. For example, the Court states:
Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such
elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements
of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allot-




92. See infra note 104.




eral government for the damages sustained. 94 Mitchell I held that the
source of law must expressly mandate compensation for damages. 95
Other courts have looked beyond the particular source of law and have
found an implicit requirement of compensation for breach by looking to
the common law of trusts. 96 The Court in Mitchell H adopted the latter
view. 97
Ordinary trust law presumes that the common law of trusts will define
the terms of a trust unless the settlor manifests a different intention. 98
Under the common law of trusts, liability follows from breach of trust. 99
Thus, under the Mitchell II analysis, unless Congress has expressly pro-
vided otherwise, liability automatically follows from breach whenever a
court finds governmental fiduciary duties.
Prior courts have adopted this "implicitly required" analysis in order
to make trust duties meaningful in Indian law cases. Most statutes and
treaties dealing with Indian issues do not expressly state that the United
States will be liable for damages caused by breach. 100 Thus, unless the
analogy to trust law is used, the government will seldom be held liable for
a breach of trust. Furthermore, a retrospective damages remedy may deter
94. Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2968 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)
(quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
95. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542 (Act does not unambiguously provide that the United States has
taken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the management of allotted lands; the Act created only a
limited trust relationship).
Several other federal courts have imposed the same requirement. See, e.g., North Slope Borough
v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (without an unambiguous provision by Congress that
clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility, whatever fiduciary obligation that otherwise exists must
be a limited one); Table Bluff Band of Indians v. Andrus, 532 F. Supp. 255, 264 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3073, 3076-77
(D.D.C. June 15, 1981).
96. See, e.g., American Indians Residing on the Maricopa-Ak Chin Reservation v. United
States, 667 F.2d 980, 990 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (trustee liability for breach of fiduciary duty inherent in trust
relationship; damages are appropriate remedy for breach), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Whisk-
ers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332, 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Coast
Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 653 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
Indians v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1392-94 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
97. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2973. The implicit rationale is that by finding a fiduciary obligation,
Congress impliedly mandated compensation for breach of trust. See Whiskers v. United States, 600
F.2d 1332, 1335 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); see also Orme, supra note 20, at 864.
98. A. ScoTr, ABRIDGEMENTOFTHE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4 (1960). Following this reasoning, courts
have used the source of the trust to define the scope of the duties, and the common law of trusts to
define the manner in which the trust is to be carried out. See Moose v. United States, 674 F.2d 1277,
1281 (9th Cir. 1982); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Eric v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous., 464 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D. Alaska 1978).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 205-212 (1959); G. BOGERT. THE LAW OF TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 862 (2d ed. 1977); 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 205.




federal officials from breaching their trust duties. 101 In cases such as this,
prospective equitable remedies are virtually worthless. 102 Finally, gov-
ernment liability for breach of trust is necessary to compensate Indians for
waste of their resources.
The Court, however, did not merely analogize to common law trust
reasoning. The Court used language which suggests that a common law
trust had actually been created. 103 It was neither necessary nor appropri-
ate to find an actual common law trust. More importantly, the legal con-
sequences of a common law trust are inconsistent with the federal-Indian
relationship. 104
First, the origin and basis of the federal-Indian trust relationship differ
from those of a common law trust relationship. 105 The federal-Indian trust
relationship was developed initially as a guardianship, and later, a trust.
The relationship was never described as a common law trust. 106
Second, several aspects of a common law trust do not apply in a fed-
eral-Indian relationship. At common law, a variety of damages are avail-
able for breach of trust. 107 Money damages are not limited to restitution
when wrongs are committed by a trustee. 08 It seems unlikely that the
courts will be willing to award damages against the federal government
for the myriad of consequential injuries awarded at common law in
breach of trust cases. 10 9 In addition, a private fiduciary has the duty of
acting with honesty and candor, solely in the interest of the benefici-
101. Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. at 2973 (quoting in part Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 550 (White, J.,
dissenting)).
102. See supra note 54.
103. Mitchell 1, 103 S. Ct. at 2972. Justice Marshall stated that all of the elements of a common
law trust were present: "a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust
corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds)." Id.
104. Commentators and courts have criticized the casual application of private trust law to the
federal-Indian trust relationship. Federal power over Indian lands is different in nature and origin
from the autonomy of a private trustee. See Note, supra note 2, at 142-43. The power of the United
States is not based upon conventional legal concepts; therefore, it should not be circumscribed by
private trust law. Indeed, "the relationship began as one of exploitation rather than protection." See
Note, Trusts: Toward an Effective Indian Remedy for Breach of Trust, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 429,
434 (1980); see also Mitchell 11, 103 S. Ct. at 2977 (Powell, J., dissenting) (to say that the United
States' duties are those of a common law trustee, and that all other consequences of the law of trusts
follow, is to use bootstrap reasoning).
105. The trust relationship was recognized by the early courts as a political, moral obligation, not
as a legal relationship. See Note, supra note 2, at 142-43.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1926) (legislation enacted
due to government's guardianship over Indian tribes and property); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (federal government has "moral obligations of the highest respon-
sibility and trust").
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTRusTs §§ 198-199 (1959).
108. Id. §§ 198,205.
109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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ary.110 This duty does not seem to be consistent with the actions of the
federal government.'ll An ordinary trustee can resign in the event of a
conflict of interest, 112 while the federal officer cannot. Moreover, courts
are without power to remove the United States from its position as trus-
tee. 113
If the United States is to be fully liable as a common law trustee, then it
follows that the government would also have the full power associated
with a common law trustee to regulate Indian affairs. Declaring that a
common law trust relationship exists in an area of Indian affairs where a
statute does not impose particular duties would give the government free
rein to administer the trust as it sees fit, thereby taking the management
power from Indians and interfering with tribal sovereignty. In effect, the
government would have more power than a common law trustee, as the
government cannot be removed from its position as trustee unless Con-
gress chooses to remove it.
Where no congressional intent exists with respect to responsibilities
and duties in an area of Indian affairs, it would be unwise to find that the
government is a common law trustee. If the government has assumed par-
ticular duties, it can still be held liable for mismanagement by analogizing
to trust law. It should not be given the powers incumbent on a common
law trustee.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Mitchell H, a claimant for money damages against the federal
government for breach of trust must still establish a substantive right as
the basis for fiduciary duties on the part of the United States. Once trust
duties are established, courts can analogize to ordinary trust law to deter-
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1959); G. BOGERT, supra note 99, § 543.
11l. In Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2917 (1983) (rejecting conflict of interest
argument where United States represents both a reservation and a reclamation project; Indians' inter-
est is not compromised), the Court stated that "the Government cannot follow the fastidious stan-
dards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single beneficiary solely by represent-
ing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's consent." See also Note, A Remedy for
a Breach of the Government-Indian Trust Duties, I N.M.L. REV. 321, 323-24 (1971) (government
does not always act with honesty and in the interest of the Indian).
112. A. ScoTT, supra note 98, § 170.23.
113. In addition, in order to alter the common law presumptions of the content of a trust, the trust
instrument (in this case probably a statute or regulation) must clearly establish what presumptions do
not apply. I A. SCOTT. supra note 1, § 4. It is unlikely that Congress' silence will be assumed to be
intended to adopt the common law presumptions of a trust. Congress would not likely take pains to
except from all statutes dealing with Indian affairs all of the common law presumptions relating to a
trust that it did not intend to be effective. In addition, where the government has assumed control of





mine that the substantive right mandates compensation in case of
breach. 114
Ultimately, whether a claimant prevails will depend on how strictly the
court chooses to interpret the source of law relied upon. A court may use
strict construction to determine that the statute or regulation does not ex-
pressly impose fiduciary duties on the government, or that the govern-
ment's willingness to assume duties was not such that the government
will be held liable in money damages for breach of those duties. How-
ever, a court guided by the liberal principles generally applicable to In-
dian law can look to either express statutory obligations or governmental
assumption of control in Indian affairs as creating the substantive right
required for a damages remedy against the government. After Mitchell H,
courts should clearly be guided by the latter approach.
Kimberly T. Ellwanger
114. In some cases, money damages will be the only appropriate remedy; they should, therefore,
be available to Indians for breach of trust duties by the United States. However, equitable remedies
remain available (although not under the Tucker Act), and in some cases will be the more desirable
remedy. In any case, an Indian or tribe should have the choice of which remedy to seek when the
United States has breached its trust responsibilities.
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